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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Petitioner

:

and Cross-Respondent,

Case No. 910218
Ct. of Apps. No. 890463-CA

v.
LOUIE EDWIN SIMS,

Category No. 13

De fendant-Re spondent
and Cross-Petitioner.

:

REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER
The following points are submitted in reply to the
arguments in defendant's responsive brief.

That brief not only

responds to the State's opening brief, but also addresses new
issues raised in defendant's cross-petition for certiorari.
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S POINT I
Defendant argues that the roadblock stop of his car
violated article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution for the
reasons set forth in the court of appeals' decision and
additional reasons it did not rely on below.

Specifically, he

contends that (1) a search or seizure of a vehicle cannot be
constitutional under article I, section 14 unless it is supported
by probable cause or other individualized suspicion of criminal
activity, and (2) to justify a roadblock stop under article I,
section 14, the state must show both individualized suspicion and
statutory authority to conduct the roadblock.

He asks the Court

to reject the balancing test adopted by the United States Supreme
Court in Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444

(1990), for determining the constitutionality of a sobriety
checkpoint under the Fourth Amendment.
The State concedes the roadblock here violated the
Fourth Amendment under Sitz's analysis, and accordingly attacks
only the court of appeals' additional holding that, because the
roadblock was not expressly authorized by statute, it was per se
unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.

The State is

concerned that the court of appeals' state constitutional holding
is not only incorrect with respect to roadblocks generally, but
is so broad that it casts doubt on the constitutionality of a
range of warrantless and suspicionless police conduct that is
thought to be legal -- e.g., searches incident to arrest and
inventory searches.
Thus, the State asks the Court to reverse the court of
appeals' sweeping state constitutional holding as poorly
reasoned, and to move directly to the consent/attenuation issue
based on the conceded Fourth Amendment violation.

An analysis of

the constitutionality of roadblocks under article I, section 14,

holding
beyond rejection of the court of appeals' statutory authority, is
A
unnecessary.
Implicitly acknowledging the limited nature of the
State's challenge to the court of appeals' constitutional
analysis, defendant initially addresses the question of whether
the court of appeals properly considered the state constitutional
issue, it having already found the roadblock unconstitutional
under the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant concludes that, under the
2

"primacy" model for the analysis of state constitutions, see
Note, The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State Constitution,
1986 Utah L. Rev. 319, 326 (hereafter "Utah State Constitution").
Utah courts should address the state constitutional question
first and then, only if necessary, move to the federal
constitution.

He then asks this Court to construe article I,

section 14 to require a showing of individualized suspicion
before a search or seizure may be conducted, and on that ground,
coupled with the grounds relied on by the court of appeals, hold
that the roadblock in this case violated the Utah Constitution.
A.

Propriety of Addressing State Constitution First
In its opening brief, the State did not argue that the

court of appeals' state constitutional holding should be rejected
as unnecessary based on the court's preceding holding that the
roadblock violated the federal constitution.
could have.

Clearly, the State

See Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d 6, 15 (Utah

1992) (Stewart, J., concurring in the result) (concluding that
Justice Durham's plurality opinion unnecessarily reached out to
hold the roadblock illegal under the Utah Constitution where the
roadblock concededly violated the Fourth Amendment).

But,

uncertain of the Court's view concerning the relative merits of
the "primacy" model versus the "interstitial" model for the
analysis of state constitutions, the State decided to address the
merits of the court of appeals' unique holding.
Constitution at 325-29 (explaining that

See Utah State

ff

[t]he primacy model

posits state constitutions as the primary source of protection
3

for individual rights," and thus state constitutional claims must
be considered first without reference to federal constitutional
doctrine; and that

fl

[t]he interstitial model sees state

constitutional law 'primarily . . . filling the spaces left open
by federal constitutional doctrine'").
Defendant, however, now raises the issue of what
approach Utah's appellate courts should adopt for state
constitutional claims.

This Court has already made clear that it

"will not engage in a state constitutional analysis unless an
argument for different analyses under the state and federal
constitutions are briefed."

State v. Laffertv, 749 P.2d 1239,

1247 n.5 (Utah 1988), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Lafferty
v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).

Nor will it consider a

state constitutional issue raised for the first time on appeal.
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1216 n.ll (Utah 1993).

But where,

as here, the issue has been preserved and a different analysis
for the state constitution is briefed, the Court has not
developed a consistent approach.

See Utah State Constitution at

329-32 (noting and then criticizing this Court's inconsistent
approach)1.
1

The author writes:
The Utah [Supreme C]ourt's inconsistent
reliance on the Utah Constitution deserves
criticism. When the court, without
explanation, alternately abstains from state
constitutional analysis and then from federal
constitutional analysis, it is constitution
shopping. Such inconsistency belies
underlying hostility toward some claims and
favoritism for other claims. If the court is
4

In the related case of Sims v. State Tax Comm'n,
Justice Durham's plurality opinion considered only whether the
roadblock stop of defendant violated article I, section 14; there
was no discussion of Sitz and the Fourth Amendment.
P.2d at 8-9.

Sims, 841

Justice Stewart's concurring opinion, however,

rejected that approach, reasoning that the state constitutional
analysis was mere dictum because the roadblock was clearly
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

Id. at 15.

The clear import of Justice Stewart's opinion is that
the Court should not reach out to interpret the content and scope
of state constitutional protections when the particular issue is
resolved in favor of individual rights under the federal
constitution.

At least this appears to be his position when

Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14 rights are under
consideration.

See also Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 16

(Howe, A.C.J., dissenting, joined by flB Hall, C.J.) (finding it
unnecessary to determine whether the roadblock was
constitutional; that the roadblock was unconstitutional could
simply be assumed for purposes of appeal); Zissi v. State Tax
Comm'n, 842 P.2d 848, 859-60 (Utah 1992) (Howe, A.C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Hall, C.J.) (flI dissent from that part [of
the majority opinion] which holds that the roadblock was illegal.
I would not reach that issue because it is unnecessary to do
not overtly choosing its result and then its
constitution, it is at least careless in its
methodology.
Utah State Constitution at 332 (footnote omitted).
5

so.").
Justice Stewart believed this approach was particularly
appropriate where the State, as it does here, assumes the Fourth
Amendment violation.

He criticized the Sims plurality on this

point:
Notwithstanding the Tax Commission's
concession that the roadblock was illegal,
Justice Durham asserts that it would be
"irresponsible" to assume the illegality of
the roadblock. She does not explain, and I
do not see, why that is so. Issues are
frequently conceded for purposes of decision.
It is therefore sufficient to hold that the
federal law requires suppression of the
illegally seized evidence.
Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 15 (Stewart, J., concurring
in the result).

Curiously, the plurality's perceived

responsibility to analyze the constitutional issue in Sims did
not deter that same plurality from accepting, without independent
analysis, the parties' assumption that another roadblock was
unconstitutional in an opinion issued just five days later, see
Zissi, 842 P.2d at 859 (authored by Justice Zimmerman and joined
in by Justices Durham and Stewart).
Justice Stewart's view is consistent with the approach
taken by a unanimous Court in State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761
(Utah 1991).

There, defendant claimed that her detention as a

passenger in a car violated the Fourth Amendment and article I,
section 14.

Id. at 762 & n.l.

The Court concluded that her

Fourth Amendment rights had been violated and declined to reach
the state constitutional question.

Id. at 762 n.l, 764. See

also Zissi, 842 P.2d at 859 (accepting, for purposes of the
6

appeal and without independent analysis, the parties' assumption
that the roadblock stop of Zissi was unconstitutional -petitioner had argued that the roadblock violated the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 14 (Br. of Pet, at 13-30)).
Justice Stewart's view is also consistent with the
stated position of a majority of this Court in State v. Watts,
750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988)2, that although article I, section 14
is generally interpreted to provide no more protection than the
Fourth Amendment, "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a
somewhat different construction may prove to be an appropriate
method for insulating this state's citizens from the vagaries of
inconsistent interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the
federal courts."

Id. at 1221 n.8. This language from Watts

suggests that departure from federal analysis is justified only
to avoid inconsistencies or ambiguities in federal Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.

But see State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415

(Utah 1991) (where the Court, in a 4-1 decision, rejected the
unambiguous United States Supreme Court holding that there is no
protected privacy interest in bank records under the Fourth
Amendment and held that such a privacy interest exists under
article I, section 14).
Accordingly, if the federal analysis clearly provides
2

The Chief Justice authored the majority opinion and was
joined by Justice Howe and Judge Orme, Utah Court of Appeals
Judge. Justice Stewart did not sit. Justice Zimmerman, joined
by Justice Durham, dissented from any suggestion in the majority
opinion that there is no substantive distinction between the
Fourth Amendment and article I, section 14. 750 P.2d at 1225-26
(Zimmerman, J., dissenting).
7

the defendant the requested constitutional protection, as in the
instant case, there is no need to consider the state
constitution.

See State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah

1985) ("It is a fundamental rule that this Court should avoid
addressing constitutional issues unless required to do so.").
The motivation to avoid "the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts" is not present.
In sum, at least for purposes of search and seizure
law, Johnson and Watts, coupled with Justice Stewart's concurring
opinion in Sims v. State Tax Comm'n and Associate Chief Justice
Howe's dissenting opinions in that case and Zissi, appear to
resolve the "primacy" versus "interstitial" issue in favor of
addressing the federal constitutional question first and moving
to the state constitution only if the federal analysis does not
provide the protection of individual rights sought by the
litigant.

Given their views in those cases, at least the Chief

Justice, Associate Chief Justice Howe, and Justice Stewart
apparently prefer the "interstitial" model, which "sees state
constitutional law 'primarily . . . filling in the spaces left
open by federal constitutional doctrine'" and "demands more
reliance on federal law, more acknowledged borrowing."
State Constitution at 328.

Utah

Indeed, in the two prominent search

and seizure cases where the lead opinions authored by Justice
Durham and joined in by Justice Zimmerman sought to apply the
primacy model, State v. Larocco and Sims v. Tax Comm'n, the
8

remaining Justices declined to sanction that approach.
Furthermore, Justice Stewart's view is sound.

If

certain police conduct violates the Fourth Amendment, it
obviously also violates article I, section 14. Therefore, once a
Fourth Amendment violation is found, it is unnecessary to go on
to consider the state constitution in search of an additional,
independent basis for finding the police conduct
unconstitutional.
advisory opinions.

To do so violates the judicial policy against
See Black v. Alpha Fin. Corp., 656 P.2d 409,

410-11 (Utah 1982) (recognizing judicial policy against advisory
opinions).
Interestingly, aside from the instant case, the court
of appeals has consistently stated that if the government action
is unconstitutional on federal grounds, the state constitutional
claim need not be considered.

See, e.g., State v. Small. 829

P.2d 129, 131 n.2 (Utah App.) (roadblock unconstitutional under
Fourth Amendment; therefore, state constitutional claim need not
be addressed), cert, denied, 843 P.2d

1042 (Utah 1992); State v.

Park, 810 P.2d 456, 458 n.l (Utah App.) (same), cert, denied, 817
P.2d 327 (Utah 1991); State v. Kitchen, 808 P.2d 1127, 1129 n.l
(Utah App. 1991) (same).

See also State v. Hewitt. 841 P.2d

1222, 1224 n.l (Utah App. 1992) (because State conceded and the
court agreed that initial traffic stop and subsequent consent to
search were invalid on federal constitutional grounds, court did
not need to address defendant's arguments under article I,
section 14).
9

Based on the foregoing, the Court could vacate as
unnecessary to the decision below the court of appeals' state
constitutional ruling.

This procedure denies precedential status

to part of the court of appeals' opinion, without this Court
having to address the merits of that ruling.

See Rule 979,

California Rules of Court (which provides for a similar
"depublishing" procedure by which the California Supreme Court
may remove precedential effect from all or part of a court of
appeal opinion).
B.

Individualized Suspicion and Article I, Section 14
If the Court is nevertheless inclined to reach

defendant's state constitutional arguments, they should be
rejected.
First, defendant argues that for a search or seizure to
be lawful under article I, section 14, it must be supported by
individualized suspicion of criminal activity3.

Such a broad

rule is contrary to this Court's holding in State v. Hyah, 711
P.2d 264, 265 (Utah 1985), that suspicionless and warrantless
inventory searches are permitted under article I, section 14.
Hyah makes clear that individualized suspicion is not always
necessary for a search or seizure to be valid under the Utah
Constitution.
And insofar as the plurality opinion in Sims v. State
Tax Comm'n (which supports defendant's argument) may be relied or
3

Defendant does not make clear whether the "individualized
suspicion" he argues for is probable cause or reasonable
suspicion (a level of suspicion below probable cause).
10

to decide the article I, section 14 issue in this case, its
analysis misses the mark.

That opinion concludes that the

suspicionless investigatory roadblock stop of defendant violated
the Utah Constitution because the requirements for a warrantless
search were not met.

Sims, 841 P.2d at 8-9.

Noting that under article I, section 14 "warrantless
searches

of automobiles will be allowed only if probable cause

and exigent circumstances exist," Sims, 841 P.2d at 8 (relying on
the plurality opinion in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah
1990)) (emphasis added), the plurality concluded that (1) "[i]n
the case of a suspicionless investigatory roadblock . . . [t]here
is no articulable, individualized suspicion of wrongdoing to
establish probable cause," and (2) "because roadblocks are
planned in advance, no exigent circumstances justify an immediate
search," id. at 8-9.
The basic flaw in this analysis is that a roadblock
stop is a seizure,

not a search.

Sitz, 496 U.S. at 450

("Petitioners concede, correctly in our view, that a Fourth
Amendment 'seizure' occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a
checkpoint."); Sims, 841 P.2d at 9 n.7 ("'Roadblocks are seizures
of the person[.]'" (quoting Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97,
743 P.2d 692, 695 (1987))).

While a search may follow the

roadblock stop, Nelson v. Lane County, 743 P.2d at 695 (quoted in
Sims, 841 P.2d at 9 n.7), the stop is nevertheless a seizure, the
validity of which is analyzed independently of the validity of
the search.

Thus, the plurality erroneously applied the state
11

constitutional principles for automobile searches

enunciated by

the same plurality in Larocco.
The plurality's confusion on this point is reflected in
its initial, erroneous application of search analysis in
determining the constitutionality of the roadblock, Sims, 841
P.2d at 8-9, and then its subsequent, proper characterization of
the roadblock as a seizure:

"In conjunction with the question of

the legality of the roadblock in this case, we must address the
question of whether Sims' subsequent consent to a search of his
car alleviates the taint of the prior illegal seizure.11
(emphasis added)).

Id. at 9

Furthermore, the plurality's requirement that

there be probable cause --as opposed to reasonable suspicion -for this investigatory stop rejects, without explanation, the
well settled reasonable suspicion standard for investigatory
stops under the Fourth Amendment.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1

(1968); Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648 (1979); State v. Gibson.
665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894 (1983).
Finally, under the plurality's view that the absence of
probable cause and exigent circumstances renders suspicionless
investigatory roadblocks unconstitutional under the Utah
Constitution, "all preplanned, suspicionless roadblocks [are]
illegal, including roadblocks intended to remove intoxicated
drivers from the highways or to enforce automobile safety
measures."
result).

Sims, 841 P.2d at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the

Although they seem to exempt from their sweeping

constitutional rule emergency roadblocks used to apprehend a
12

fleeing felon and statutorily authorized ports of entry and fish
and game roadblocks, Sims, 841 P.2d at 8 n.3, the plurality fails
to explain how those suspicionless investigatory stops could
escape unscathed.

Those seizures, like the roadblock here, fail

to meet either one or both of the plurality's requirements of
probable cause and exigent circumstances.
To conclude, defendant's contention, that a search or
seizure must be supported by individualized suspicion of criminal
activity in order to be valid under article I, section 14, is
contrary to State v. Hycrh. Furthermore, although the Sims
plurality opinion provides support for defendant's argument, that
opinion is seriously flawed and should not be followed.
C.

Express Statutory Authority

Defendant argues that the warrant and reasonableness
requirements of article I, section 14 justify the court of
appeals' holding that the roadblock was per se unconstitutional
because it was not expressly authorized by statute.

To make his

argument he relies on the conclusion of the plurality in Sims v.
State Tax Comm'n that there was no statutory authority -- express
or implied -- for the roadblock at which defendant was stopped.
Recognizing that the State concedes there was no
express statutory authority for the roadblock, defendant takes
issue with the State's contention that roadblocks are impliedly
authorized by statute and that other accepted police practices -specifically, searches incident to arrest and inventory searches
-- are not expressly authorized by statute.
13

To be clear, the State argues that roadblocks are
impliedly authorized by statutes pertaining to the general
authority of law enforcement officers.
at 7.

See State's Opening Br.

This is so whether the roadblock is used to control

traffic, enforce automobile safety measures, apprehend a fleeing
felon, or remove intoxicated drivers from the road.

Granted

there may be certain constitutional restrictions on the various
types of roadblocks, but that does not undercut the conclusion
that they are impliedly within an officer's general statutory
authority to enforce the law.
The legislature has granted peace officers broad
authority to enforce the laws of this state.

For example, the

Utah Highway Patrol is statutorily authorized to "enforce the
state laws and rules governing use of the state highways" and to
"regulate traffic on all highways and roads of the state."

Utah

Code Ann. § 27-10-4(a) & (b) (1989) (renumbered effective July 1,
1993, Utah Code Ann. § 53-8-105(1) & (2) (Supp. 1993)).

Under

Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-914(1) (Supp. 1992), municipal police
officers have the "authority to preserve the public peace,
prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots,
protect persons and property, remove nuisances existing in the
public streets, roads, and highways, enforce every law relating
to the suppression of offenses, and perform all duties required
of them by ordinance or resolution."

Similar statutes relate to

the duties of the sheriff and sheriff's deputies, Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-22-2 (1991), and the duties of peace officers generally to
14

enforce the provisions of the Motor Vehicle Act, Utah Code Ann. §
41-1-17 (1988) .
These statutes are most reasonably read as giving the
police broad authority to engage in any law enforcement practice
that is constitutional, unless a specific statutory restriction
exists.

See People v. Estrada. 68 Ill.App.3d 272, 386 N.E.2d

128, 133-34, cert, denied. 444 U.S. 968 (1979).
Defendant ignores these statutes, contending the only
statutes that potentially authorize roadblocks -- Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-1-17 (1988)4 and Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15 (1990)5 -- both
require that an officer have at least a reasonable suspicion to
stop.
4

See also Sims v. State Tax Comm'n, 841 P.2d at 9 n.7
Section 41-1-17 provides in pertinent part:
[P]eace officers [and] state patrolman . .
. shall have power and it shall be their
duty:
. . .

(c) When on duty, upon reasonable belief
that any vehicle is being operated in
violation of any provision of this act or of
any law regulating the operation of vehicles
to require the driver thereof to stop,
exhibit his driver's license and the
registration card issued for the vehicles
[sic] and submit to an inspection of such
vehicle, the registration plates and
registration card thereon.
5

Section 77-7-15 provides:
A peace officer may stop any person in a
public place when he has a reasonable
suspicion to believe he has committed or is
in the act of committing or is attempting to
commit a public offense and may demand his
name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
15

("[I]n the existing statutes, the Utah Legislature has provided
that suspicion of wrongdoing is a condition precedent for
authority to stop a person or vehicle.

See Utah Code Ann. § 41-

3-105(8) (b), 77-7-15. This serves as additional support for our
rejection of implicit statutory authority for investigatory
roadblocks.")11.

He apparently believes, as did the Sims

plurality, that the referenced statutes are limitations on an
officer's authority to make a stop of a vehicle or its occupants.
He misconstrues the statutes.
Section 77-7-15 is merely a codification of the
constitutional standard for an investigatory stop enunciated in
Terry v. Ohio.

State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 541 (Utah App.

1990); State v. Holmes, 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989).
Similarly, section 41-1-17 is nothing more than a codification of
the constitutional standard for an investigatory stop of a
vehicle set forth in Delaware v. Prouse (under the Fourth
Amendment, to lawfully stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes,
an officer must have at least a reasonable suspicion that either
the vehicle or an occupant has violated or is about to violate
the law -- i.e., a traffic or equipment regulation, or an
applicable criminal law).
Contrary to the construction defendant and the Sims
plurality would give these provisions, they do not prescribe the
only circumstances in which an officer may stop a vehicle or its

4

^Tho State ij unable to^loefrfca ceotion-41 3 105(0) (b)r
oited by tho Cimo plurality.' \2>^lf)
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occupants.

Had that been the legislature's intent, it would have

used appropriate limiting language, such as:
stop a vehicle only

"An officer may

if there is at least a reasonable suspicion

of criminal activity."

Instead, sections 77-7-15 and 41-1-17

merely codify established federal constitutional standards
without prohibiting other police conduct that, although outside
the scope of these statutes, is nevertheless constitutional and
impliedly authorized by statute.
Finally, defendant disputes the State's contention that
searches incident to arrest and inventory searches, presumably
constitutional police practices, are not expressly authorized by
statute and do not require individualized suspicion.

He claims

the opposite is true.
While the power to arrest is authorized by statute and
probable cause is required to justify an arrest, that says
nothing about the prerequisites for a search incident to arrest.
The arrest, which is a seizure of the person, is distinct from
the search.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 26. And, in United

States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973), the Supreme Court
specifically rejected the argument that there must be
individualized suspicion beyond the probable cause for an arrest
to justify a warrantless search incident thereto:

"A custodial

arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable
intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires
justification"

(emphasis added).
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additional

Thus# the Supreme Court has made clear that
individualized suspicion is not required to justify a search
incident to arrest.

Nor does the authority to search arise from

the statutes authorizing arrest; a search incident to arrest,
which is distinct from the arrest itself, is independently
authorized by Supreme Court case law.

Compare Utah Code Ann. §

77-7-9 (1990) ("Any person making an arrest may seize from the
person arrested all weapons which he may have on or about his
person.").
Similarly, the "reasonable and proper justification"
language from State v. Hyah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), upon which
defendant relies for his argument that inventory searches require
individualized suspicion and are expressly authorized by statute,
refers to impoundment of a vehicle, the seizure that necessarily
precedes an inventory search.
reads:

The entire sentence from Hyah

"In order to support a finding that a valid inventory

search has taken place, the court must first determine whether
there was reasonable and proper justification for the impoundment
of the vehicle."

711 P.2d at 268. The justification for the

initial seizure (the impoundment) "can be had either through
explicit statutory authorization or by the circumstances of the
stop."

Ibid.

Again, defendant fails to recognize the

distinction between the search and the seizure in this context.
The inventory search itself is not authorized by statute, nor
must it be supported by individualized suspicion.
Dakota v. Qpperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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See South

In sum, roadblocks are implicitly authorized by
statute, and the absence of express statutory authority does not
render them per se unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution,
D.

The Sitz Balancing Test

In Sitz, the Supreme Court adopted a balancing test for
determining the constitutionality of a sobriety checkpoint
operated by the police.

Defendant urges the Court to reject that

test in determining whether the roadblock in this case violated
article I, section 14.
As previously argued, this Court need not consider the
state constitutional issue beyond either a determination that the
court of appeals erroneously reached out to decide the article I,
section 14 question, or a determination that the court of
appeals' express statutory authority holding is incorrect.
Defendant's invitation to reject the Sitz analysis should,
therefore, be left for future consideration.

This is

particularly true in light of the enactment, after the court of
appeals' decision in this case, of statutes authorizing the type
of roadblock employed here (Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-23-101 through 105 (Supp. 1993)).

See Sims v. State Tax Comm'n. 841 P.2d at 9

("Whether constitutionally sufficient standards and guidelines
could be incorporated in statutory form is a question we leave
for future consideration.11).
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REPLY TO DEFENDANT" S POINT II
Responding to the State's argument that the court of
appeals incorrectly applied the exploitation prong of the Arroyo
test7, defendant focuses on the flagrancy factor and contends
that the roadblock here constituted a flagrant constitutional
violation.

Therefore, he argues, defendant's consent to a search

of his car could not be valid in the absence of intervening
circumstances or a significant lapse of time.
In State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1263 (Utah 1993),
the Court made clear that H

"Arroyo's primary goal was to deter

the police from engaging in illegal conduct even though that
conduct may be followed by a voluntary consent to the subsequent
search."

"[T]he analysis used to invalidate consent on the basis

of exploitation [is] grounded firmly in the deterrent purposes of
the exclusionary rule."

Ibid.

""The 'purpose and flagrancy'

factor directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression[,]
. . . [and] '[t]he deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule
necessarily assumes that the police have engaged in willful, or
at the very least negligent, conduct which has deprived the
defendant of some right.'"

Ibid, (quoting Brown v. Illinois. 422

U.S. 590, 612 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring), in turn quoting
Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 447 (1974)).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the use of the
roadblock here did not even constitute negligent police conduct,
and thus the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule would not
7

State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
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be fulfilled by suppressing the drugs found in the consent search
of defendant's car.

In United States v. Prichard. 645 F.2d 854

(10th Cir.), cert, denied, 454 U.S. 832 (1981), the Tenth Circuit
upheld against a Fourth Amendment challenge a roadblock conducted
by New Mexico state police officers with the knowledge and
permission of their supervisors. As the court noted, "The stated
purpose of the roadblock was to conduct a routine driver's
license and car registration check.

The officers candidly

conceded, however, that if they observed indicia of other crimes
during their check of drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations, they intended to enforce the law."

645 F.2d at

855.
In holding that the roadblock was constitutional under
Delaware v. Prouse, the court said:

"The purpose of the

roadblock, i.e., to check drivers' licenses and car
registrations, was a legitimate one.

If, in the process of so

doing, the officers saw evidence of other crimes, they had the
right to take reasonable investigative steps and were not
required to close their eyes."

Id. at 857.

The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the Prichard holding in
numerous subsequent cases. United States v. Obreaon, 748 F.2d
1371, 1376 (10th Cir. 1984); United States v. Lopez. 777 F.2d
543, 547 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Corral. 823 F.2d
1389, 1392 (10th Cir. 1987), cert, denied. 486 U.S. 1054 (1988).
Indeed, in Lopez, the court rejected an argument similar to the
one made by defendant:

that, because the officers at the
21

driver's license/vehicle registration roadblock were also looking
for evidence of illegal activity, the roadblock was an
unconstitutional multi-purpose roadblock.

777 F.2d at 547.

Based on the Tenth Circuit decisions upholding the New
Mexico roadblocks, it cannot be said that the officers in the
instant case flagrantly violated the Fourth Amendment or article
I, section 14 when they conducted their pre-Sitz, pre-Sims
roadblock.

In fact, the Tenth Circuit decisions gave them every

reason to believe the roadblock was constitutional.

Thus,

although the roadblock was later ruled unconstitutional by the
court of appeals, the officers did not even negligently, let
alone flagrantly, violate the federal or state constitutions.

In

short, it cannot be said they should have known (the standard for
negligence) that the roadblock was unconstitutional.
Accordingly, the roadblock at which defendant was
stopped constituted neither a flagrant nor a negligent
constitutional violation.

Further, based on the exploitation

analysis set forth in the State's opening brief, which assumes a
non-flagrant violation for purposes of applying the Arroyo test,
suppression of the drugs found in defendant's car pursuant to his
voluntary consent to search is not warranted.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments and the arguments
contained in the State's opening brief, this Court should reverse
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the court of appeals and affirm defendant's conviction.
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